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1. Extended Cognition and Natural Kinds 
 
Most work in cognitive science and naturalistic philosophy of mind is unashamedly 
internalist in outlook, in at least the following sense: the parts of the physical world 
where psychological states occur and where psychological processes happen are 
held to be located entirely inside the head. One’s first reaction to this sort of 
internalism about the mind might well be that it must be right. Indeed, given all 
those wonderful ‘pictures of the brain thinking’ that have been delivered over the 
past few years by contemporary neuroimaging techniques, where else could the 
material machinery of mind be? Enter the hypothesis of extended cognition 
(henceforth ExC).1 If ExC is true, there are actual (in this world) cases of intelligent 
thought and action, in which the material machinery that realizes the thinking and 
thoughts concerned is spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a 
way that the external (beyond-the-skull-and-skin) factors concerned are rightly 
accorded cognitive status. Here, ‘cognitive status’ is just a place-holder for ‘whatever 
status it is that we standardly grant the brain when explaining intelligent thought 
and action’.  
 
What has ExC got to do with the topic of natural kinds?  To answer this question, we 
need to say something about what natural kinds are. It seems to me that, in the 
present context, we can safely go along with Rupert (more on whom below) and 
start from the following thought. ‘Natural kinds are simply the causal-explanatory 
properties and kinds of the successful sciences, or to be a bit more careful, the 
properties and kinds that our sciences attempt to identify. As such, they are the 
kinds or properties that ground successful induction… appear as relata in laws of 
nature… or play causal-explanatory roles.’2 This is essentially a commitment-light 
characterization of natural kinds, in that, for all it says, natural kinds may or may not 
be cluster-based, may or may not be family-resemblance-based, and so on. This is 
deliberate, since the opening connection with ExC that I am about to describe is 
neutral on such matters of detail. We will, of course, be focussing our attention on 
those natural kinds that make up the basic metaphysical furniture of minds, what we 
might call the psychological natural kinds, or, as I shall say, the cognitive kinds. 
Assuming our commitment-light characterization of natural kinds, cognitive kinds 





Against this backdrop, ExC becomes linked to the question of cognitive kinds, and, 
as we shall see, to the more specific theme of taking scientific practice seriously in 
our understanding of such natural kinds, via a particular argument for ExC that 
takes its cue from the following claim by Clark and Chalmers: ‘[b]y using the ‘belief’ 
notion in a wider [i.e., extended] way, it picks out something more akin to a natural 
kind. The notion becomes deeper and more unified, and is more useful in 
explanation’3. Taking it for granted that the practice of explanation that is relevant 
here is explanation in cognitive science, this claim turns on the thought that a 
theoretical framework for cognitive science that endorses extended cognitive kinds – 
cognitive kinds whose physical instantiations are spread out over brain, body and 
world – will be explanatorily more powerful than one that does not. Add in the 
surely defensible thought that our best theoretical framework for cognitive science is 
also our most reliable guide to how nature is carved up into the cognitive and the 
non-cognitive, and we get what Rupert calls the natural kinds argument for the 
extended mind (henceforth NKA).4   
 
As it happens, Clark and Chalmers themselves seem to believe that commonsense 
notions of psychological phenomena ought to play a regulative role in determining 
the cognitive kinds that are operative in scientific psychology. This opens the door to 
some thorny issues concerning the relationship between commonsense psychology 
and extended cognition,5 but right now we can safely ignore such problems, since 
Rupert’s interpretation of NKA takes commonsense psychology out of the picture. 
NKA, as Rupert understands it, attempts to establish ExC on the grounds that our 
best cognitive science will trade in extended cognitive kinds. Maybe these kinds will 
be identical to, or somehow influenced by, our commonsense psychological notions, 
or maybe they won’t. In any case, it’s the practice of science that ultimately calls the 
metaphysical shots. From now on, then, I am going to leave Clark and Chalmers 
almost entirely behind, and concentrate on the ‘pure-science’ interpretation of NKA 
proposed by Rupert.   
 
2. The Rupert Dilemma 
 
Here is Rupert’s formulation of NKA:  
 
Premise 1 If the most explanatorily powerful (known) framework for 
theorizing in a given domain presupposes a given taxonomy of states, we 
should at least tentatively accept the existence of states of the kinds in 
question. 
Premise 2 The most explanatorily powerful (known) framework for 
theorizing about intelligent behavior presupposes kinds that, in fact, have 
a significant number of instances external to the human organism. 
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Conclusion Therefore, we should at least tentatively accept the extended 
view of human cognition.6 
 
Premise 2 tells us that, for NKA to succeed, there would need to be causal-
explanatory factors at work in our best known cognitive science that (i) count as 
cognitive kinds and (ii) have extended instances. Rupert claims that any attempt to 
find structures that satisfy these two necessary conditions runs aground on a 
dilemma. Let’s call this the Rupert Dilemma.7  
 
To set things up, Rupert observes that any cognitive kind will be either fine-grained 
or coarse-grained, and either benchmarked or non-benchmarked. A fine-grained kind 
is one individuated by the sorts of detailed psychological properties and dynamics 
with which practising cognitive scientists are often concerned. A coarse-grained kind 
is one that is insensitive to such detailed properties and dynamics. A cognitive kind 
is benchmarked if the theorist has begun by singling out an uncontroversial case of a 
cognitive kind in a recognized group of thinkers and then proceeded to identify 
further instances of the same kind by way of similarity with that paradigmatic 
example. Given that the only cognition we know much about is human cognition, 
the natural choice of benchmark-supplying group will be human thinkers. A 
cognitive kind is non-benchmarked if one’s individuation procedure does not turn on 
any such uncontroversial case. Rupert then assesses the different ways in which 
these principles of individuation might be combined by the proponent of ExC in her 
attempt to justify premise 2 of NKA. His test case is a core cognitive phenomenon, 
namely memory. 
 
Let’s begin by pruning the options. Although Rupert doesn’t explicitly open his own 
treatment of NKA with this move, his view, as I understand it, is that there are really 
only two combinations of the foregoing individuating principles that stand any 
chance of success. That’s because, for Rupert, whether we are on the hunt for fine-
grained or coarse-grained cognitive kinds, our theorizing has no viable point of 
departure other than the known instances of cognitive kinds that are ordinarily 
thought to be located in human brains. In light of this, any sort of non-benchmarked 
approach threatens to be a methodological disaster characterized by lost bearings 
and under-constrained speculations. So any prospect of justifying premise 2 of NKA 
by appeal to non-benchmarked cognitive kinds, whether fine-grained or coarse-
grained, is summarily eliminated. We can simply ignore the two non-benchmarked 
options.  
 
Two options remain. The first is to adopt a benchmarked, fine-grained approach to 
cognitive kinds, where the benchmark-supplying group is human beings. In 
considering this strategy, as applied to memory, Rupert first notes that the 
widespread view in cognitive science is that human memory is a massively diverse 
phenomenon involving many different mechanisms. This suggests that, from a fine-
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grained perspective, memory isn’t a cognitive kind at all, in which case necessary 
condition (i), as specified above, isn’t satisfied. The fan of NKA might try to side-step 
this worry by taking the fine-grained causal-explanatory factors themselves to be the 
cognitive kinds. But then a different problem arises, namely that these kinds 
plausibly won’t have extended instances, in which case condition (ii) isn’t satisfied. 
To give just one illustrative example, there are psychological experiments which 
demonstrate that human organic memory is sensitive to what is called the 
generation effect, according to which subjects gain a mnemonic advantage by 
generating their own meaningful connections between paired associate items to be 
learned. Rupert argues that the generation effect will simply not occur in some 
candidates for extended memory systems (e.g., in a system according to which, 
during recall, the subject refers to a notebook in which the paired associates are 
accompanied by connection sentences produced by that subject during learning, but 
which were entered into the notebook by the experimenter). He concedes that it 
might occur in others (e.g., in a system according to which, during recall, the subject 
refers to a notebook in which the paired associates to be learned are accompanied by 
connection sentences produced and entered by that subject during learning). In the 
latter case, however, he suggests that the effect is an accidental feature, rather than 
an essential or defining dimension, of the candidate storage-and-retrieval system. 
The moral is this: if we individuate our memory-related cognitive kinds in a fine-
grained, benchmarked way (the generation effect being our illustrative example of a 
fine-grained property of human memory), then they don’t have extended instances. 
Condition (ii) is not satisfied, premise 2 remains unjustified, and NKA fails. 
 
The second, and only remaining, option is to adopt a benchmarked, coarse-grained 
approach to memory. Here, Rupert targets the issue of coarseness of grain (so, in 
fact, his argument would apply equally to a non-benchmarked, coarse-grained 
approach, but that option has already been eliminated). Rupert claims that if we 
individuate memory in a coarse-grained way, for example as the context-sensitive 
storage and retrieval of information, then although we may secure a structure that 
does important work in organizing the explanatory practices of cognitive 
psychologists, what we don’t get is a cognitive kind. Consider the following case8, 
which may be thought of as an example of benchmarking, assuming our benchmark-
supplying group can be stretched to include conceivable human beings. If a team of 
orthodox cognitive psychologists were introduced to an unusual human subject 
whose purely organic memory system didn’t exhibit the generation effect, but who 
nevertheless continued to achieve the context-sensitive selective storage and 
retrieval of information, it seems clear that they wouldn’t pronounce this subject to 
be lacking a memory. What this seems to indicate is that the generation effect is an 
accidental, rather than a defining, feature of human memory, and therefore that it 
would be a mistake to attend to such fine-grained features when individuating one’s 
cognitive kinds. But now notice that if exhibiting the generation effect is not 
necessary for a system to instantiate the cognitive kind of (coarse-grained) memory, 
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then the failure of an extended storage-and retrieval system to exhibit that 
phenomenon is no barrier to it realizing the same cognitive kind. NKA is back in the 
game.  
 
In response, Rupert argues that the genuine and important contribution that may be 
made by the notion of coarse-grained memory, in organizing and shaping the 
explanatory practices of cognitive psychologists, isn’t sufficient for it to count as a 
genuine natural kind. Here Rupert draws an analogy with the notion of ‘Bell Labs 
research’, which is a convenient and useful notion for grouping together all the 
innovations that were developed in those labs, but one which carries no implication 
that the research thereby grouped together exhibits any fundamental unity. 
Similarly, ‘memory’ might be a convenient and useful term for grouping together 
some diverse processes that share certain behavioural similarities, but it carries no 
implication that the processes in question exhibit the kind of fundamental unity that 
would make memory a natural kind. So, how do we know when we are using an 
authentic coarse-grained natural kind term, rather than a merely organizational one? 
Rupert argues that what distinguishes a genuine coarse-grained scientific natural 
kind from a mere pragmatically useful grouping is that the various instances of a 
coarse-grained natural kind bear family resemblances to each other determined by 
overlaps between (a) the causal-explanatory elements that constitute those instances 
and (b) the relations between those elements. What this suggests is that if two 
phenomena are instances of a genuine coarse-grained natural kind, we will be able 
to get smoothly from the first to the second by, as Rupert puts it, ‘tweaking and 
extending’ the relevant scientific model (by adding a term, say, or by adjusting 
certain parameter values). This picture of natural kinds is mandated, argues Rupert, 
by the practice of scientists in taking an existing model of some recognized 
phenomenon and tweaking or extending that model in various ways in order to 
explain some new phenomenon, with the thought that if this can be achieved, then 
the new phenomenon is of the same kind as the first (that is, there is a coarse-grained 
kind that subsumes them both), whereas, if this cannot be achieved, the new 
phenomenon is of a different kind to the first (that is, there is no coarse-grained kind 
that subsumes them both).   
 
At this point, one might complain that Rupert has just smuggled in an account of 
coarse-grained natural kinds that goes beyond the commitment-light notion of a 
natural kind that he endorses earlier in his treatment (see above). This is an issue to 
which we shall return. What is important right now is that if we generalize this part 
of Rupert’s argument, we get the following result: plugging coarse-grained 
groupings of the sort envisaged – benchmarked or not – into NKA would deliver 
ExC, if those groupings were causal-explanatory in the right way so as to count as 
natural kinds; but they are not. Condition (i) is not satisfied, premise 2 remains 




We can now formulate the Rupert Dilemma.  
 
First horn: If the fan of ExC individuates her cognitive kinds in a 
benchmarked, fine-grained way – say by appealing to the explanatory 
factors typically of interest in established human cognitive psychology – 
then the external elements in any candidate distributed system fail to 
count as cognitive kinds. Given the fact that, according to NKA, we find 
cognitive states and processes where, and only where, the cognitive kinds 
are, this means that the external elements in question fail to enjoy 
cognitive status (in the sense outlined earlier). So NKA fails.   
 
Second horn: If, by contrast, the fan of ExC attempts to individuate her 
cognitive kinds in a benchmarked, coarse-grained way – one that is 
insensitive to the fine-grained character of human psychology as revealed 
by established cognitive psychology – then the structures that she ends up 
with are not cognitive kinds at all (wherever they are located). Given the 
fact that, according to NKA, we find cognitive states and processes where, 
and only where, the cognitive kinds are, this means that the external 
elements in question fail to enjoy cognitive status (in the sense outlined 
earlier). So NKA fails.   
 
Given the assumption that we have exhausted all the available options for 
individuating cognitive kinds, Rupert concludes that NKA should be rejected.  
 
3. Extended Physical Symbol Systems  
 
The first horn of the Rupert Dilemma would be defused, if there are benchmarked, 
fine-grained cognitive kinds with extended instances. I think it plausible that such 
kinds exist. Here is just one class of examples.  
 
Bechtel9 defends the view that high-end cognitive achievements such as linguistic 
behaviour, natural deduction and mathematical reasoning are often the result of 
sensorimotor-mediated interactions between internal connectionist networks 
(processing architectures inspired by the abstract organization of the brain) and 
certain external representational systems (e.g., mathematical languages, natural 
languages) in which atomic symbols are combined and manipulated according to the 
principles of a compositional syntax and semantics. The capacity of connectionist 
networks to recognize, and to generalize from, patterns in training data, plus the 
temporal constraints that characterize real embodied engagements with stretches of 
external symbol arrangements (e.g. different parts of the input will be available to 
the network at different times, due to the restrictions imposed by temporal 
processing windows) are harnessed to allow those networks to be appropriately 




Bechtel himself seems to hold that the genuinely cognitive part of the proposed 
distributed solution here remains skin-side.10 But there is an alternative view 
available.11 Newell and Simon once claimed (famously) that a suitably organized 
‘physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general 
intelligent action’.12 A physical symbol system (henceforth PSS) is (roughly) a 
materially instantiated, automatic compositional system. More precisely, it is a 
material system in which atomic symbols are automatically combined and 
manipulated by structure-sensitive processes, according to the principles of a 
compositional syntax and semantics. Although Newell and Simon adopted what we 
might call an unrestricted form of this hypothesis (i.e., all cognition is the result of a 
suitably organized PSS), one might reasonably adopt a more restricted version. For 
example, let’s proceed – as many classical computational psychologists focussed on 
the human mind manifestly have – by holding that a suitably organized PSS has the 
sufficient means for certain high-end cognitive achievements. I suggest that Bechtel’s 
distributed architecture of an inner processing network coupled to an external 
symbol system qualifies as an extended PSS. Of course, more would need to be said 
to drive home this idea13, but let’s assume that any concerns can be met. What we are 
pursuing is a benchmarked, fine-grained approach to cognitive kinds, since we are 
concentrating on the sorts of fine-grained causal-explanatory properties (those 
patterns of combinatorial symbol structure and coupled network dynamics specific 
to linguistic behaviour, natural deduction or mathematical reasoning) that an area of 
established human cognitive psychology (classical computational psychology) takes 
to be theoretically important.  And yet, contra Rupert, the approach delivers 
extended cognitive kinds, in that some of the kind-constituting elements (the symbol 
structures) are externally located. By NKA, then, the Bechtel architecture is not only 
an extended PSS; it is also an extended cognitive system. With this, the first horn of 
the Rupert dilemma, and thus the dilemma itself, is neutralized. Resisting the 
temptation to retire early, however, let’s see what the prospects are for nullifying the 
second horn too.  
 
4. Cognitive Kinds, Martian Kinds and the Sprevak Dilemma  
 
The second horn of the Rupert Dilemma would be defused, if there are 
benchmarked, coarse-grained cognitive kinds with extended instances. Recall that 
Rupert endeavours to block this thought by arguing that the coarse-grained 
structures on offer fail to count as natural kinds, because they fail his family-
resemblance test. As Rupert explains: ‘If, for example, a Martian exhibits memory-
related behavior, but that behavior is produced by a collection of very different 
mechanisms from the ones that produce memory-related behavior in humans (and 
the Martian process is not amenable to tweak-and-extend modeling), then the 
Martian behavior is not produced by memories, at least not if we want to use 
‘memory’ as a natural-kind term, rather than, say, as a merely organizational term’.14 
8 
 
This sets Rupert against a view that is expressed (although not thereby endorsed) by 
Sprevak as the Martian intuition. The Martian intuition is a multiple-realization 
principle that Sprevak takes to be at work in standard functionalist theorizing about 
the mind.  
 
[I]t is possible for creatures with mental states to exist even if such 
creatures have a different physical and biological makeup to ourselves. 
An intelligent organism might have green slime instead of neurons, it 
might be made out of silicon rather than carbon, it might have different 
kinds of connections in its “nervous” system… The Martian intuition 
applies to fine-grained psychology as well as physiology: there is no 
reason why a Martian should have exactly the same fine-grained 
psychology as ours. A Martian’s pain response may not decay in exactly 
the same way as ours, its learning profiles and reaction times may not 
exactly match ours, the typical causes and effects of its mental states may 
not be exactly the same as ours, even the large-scale functional 
relationships between the Martian’s cognitive systems (e.g. between its 
memory and perception) may not exactly match ours.15 
 
If we interpret the Martian intuition in terms of cognitive kinds, the moral for us is 
that the grain of our cognitive kinds needs to be set sufficiently coarsely so that 
Martian and human thinkers may share cognitive kinds, even if, at the fine-grained 
functional level, collections of very different mechanisms are operative. For reasons 
explained earlier, this sort of coarse-grained approach to cognitive kinds delivers 
ExC. More specifically, in the present context, the Martian intuition is supposed to 
strengthen NKA, because its independent plausibility adds weight against Rupert’s 
apparently ExC-hostile account of what constitutes a genuine coarse-grained natural 
kind. Unfortunately, by using the Martian intuition to tip the scales in her favour, 
the proponent of NKA runs into trouble. For the Martian intuition helps to generate 
a second putative dilemma for ExC, a dilemma that has been lodged in the literature 
by Sprevak. Let’s call this the Sprevak dilemma.16  
 
To bring the Sprevak dilemma into view, we need one more idea that is arguably at 
the heart of ExC, the so-called parity principle.17 The parity principle asks us to 
consider an actual system that generates some psychologically interesting outcome 
and whose operation involves an important functional contribution from certain 
externally located elements. It then encourages us to imagine a hypothetical scenario 
in which exactly the same functional contribution, to an equivalent outcome, is made 
by certain internally located elements. Having taken this imaginative step, if we then 
judge that the internal realizing elements in the hypothetical case count as bona fide 
parts of a genuinely cognitive system, we ought to conclude that the very same 
status (i.e., cognitive status) should be granted to the external realizing elements in 
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the actual, environment-involving case. To do otherwise would be to succumb to 
neural chauvinism.  
 
For the sake of argument, let’s agree that the Martian intuition and the parity 
principle are indeed keystones of ExC. Given this, Sprevak argues as follows. Take 
an example of an externally located element that intuitively looks to be a wildly 
unlikely candidate for cognitive status. Now imagine a functionally equivalent 
element located inside the head of a Martian. According to the Martian intuition, we 
should grant that inner Martian analogue cognitive status. But then, according to the 
parity principle, we must also grant cognitive status to the externally located 
element identified at step one, the element, that is, that was offered as a wildly 
unlikely candidate for any such status. Thus, Sprevak concludes, ExC as 
characterized is unavoidably and wildly over-permissive with respect to what 
counts as cognitive, a fact which gives us good reason to reject the view. Of course, 
the advocate of ExC could avoid this problem of over-permissiveness, if she could 
either give up the Martian intuition (and so not count the inner Martian analogue as 
cognitive, thereby blocking the application of the parity principle) or give up the 
parity principle (and so not count the external element as cognitive, even if the 
internal Martian analogue does count); but (we have agreed) the Martian intuition 
and the parity principle are keystones of ExC, so she can give up neither. That’s the 
Sprevak dilemma.      
 
To see what has gone wrong18, we need to focus on how the above argument unfolds 
in the case of one of Sprevak’s flagship examples of an external factor to which the 
granting of cognitive status would be excessively permissive, namely a so-far-
unused, not-even-known-about desktop computer program that calculates the dates 
of the Mayan calendar five-thousand years into the future. Sprevak invites us to 
consider a functionally equivalent program inside a Martian head. At this point the 
Martian intuition is supposed to kick in and the latter program qualifies for 
cognitive status. Since, by hypothesis, the external program and the in-the-head 
Martian program are functionally equivalent, the application of the parity principle 
then drives us into the arms of the troublesome conclusion that the desktop program 
is part of the computer user’s extended mind.  
 
How should the proponent of ExC respond? One promising move would be to deny 
that the Martian intuition requires the in-the-Martian-head program to be awarded 
cognitive status. This would block the subsequent, parity-based step in the 
argument. This looks to be eminently achievable. After all, the desktop program is 
presumably supposed to be an isolated and removable application, one that the 
human user would have to somehow find and learn how to use. It’s plausibly this 
lack of any functional integration into an organized economy of existing cognitive 
states and processes that makes us want to resist the claim that the desktop program 
has cognitive status. But surely if we put a program like that in a Martian head, then 
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we continue to have warrant to deny it cognitive status on precisely the same 
grounds, namely that it’s insufficiently functionally integrated into the Martian’s 
cognitive economy.  Of course, the implication of this move is that we may well all 
carry around, in our heads, neurally realized structures that don’t count as parts of 
our mental machinery, because those elements fail to meet the functional integration 
condition. But, unless one holds that merely being inside a head is sufficient for an 
element to enjoy cognitive status, whatever else may be true of that element, that 
idea seems perfectly innocuous. For example, the glial cells in our brains perform 
various incontestably non-cognitive tasks, such as holding neurons in place and 
supplying them with nutrients and oxygen. Furthermore, the idea of non-cognitive 
inner elements seems to be in harmony with the fair treatment ethos of the parity 
principle (which denies that spatial location is a relevant factor in determining 
cognitive status) and the Martian intuition (since where there is a lack of functional 
integration on the scale of the inner or outer Mayan calendar program, we are 
beyond talk of large-scale functional differences). With this, the Sprevak dilemma is 
neutralized.  
 
It looks as if the only remaining challenge for the fan of NKA is to provide an 
explanation of how it is possible to secure genuine coarse-grained cognitive kinds 
with extended instances, while remaining mindful of Rupert’s worry about merely 
organizational terms. Here is a proposal. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that, if we 
accept that being a PSS is sufficient for certain cognitive capacities, then the first 
horn of the Rupert Dilemma may be defused, because capacity-specific distributed 
arrangements of inner connectionist networks and external compositional symbol 
systems, coupled via sensorimotor control, provide us with examples of extended, 
benchmarked, fine-grained cognitive kinds. This way of salvaging NKA was 
purchased by highlighting the fine-grained properties and dynamics of such systems 
at a capacity-specific level. However, if we adjust our metaphysical spectacles, it is 
plausible that each of these capacity-specific arrangements counts as an instance of a 
bona fide coarse-grained cognitive kind, namely a PSS. Any temptation to think of 
‘PSS’ as a ‘merely organizational term’ is surely misplaced, in virtue of the fact that 
the different capacity-specific arrangements in question will presumably exhibit the 
right sort of family resemblances to satisfy Rupert, namely overlaps between the 
causal-explanatory elements (structure-sensitive syntactic rules, compositional 
symbol structures) that figure in the different instances of PSSs which contribute to 
different high-end cognitive achievements. If this is right, then there are 
benchmarked, coarse-grained cognitive kinds with extended instances – namely 
extended PSSs – and the second horn of the Rupert dilemma is disarmed. Thus we 
arrive at a situation in which the proponent of ExC can comfortably occupy either 
horn of the Rupert dilemma. And that’s another way of saying that there is no such 







Faced with the Rupert dilemma and (in a supporting role) the Sprevak dilemma, it 
might have seemed as if this is the worst of times to be arguing for extended 
cognition by way of the thought that cognitive kinds – the causal-explanatory 
natural kinds that figure in the practice of our best cognitive science – have extended 
instances. But, as I have argued, it is in truth the best of times for this argument, 
because paying close attention to the relevant scientific practice reveals it to be 
hardily resistant to both dilemmas. We are in the epoch of the extended mind.19  
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